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Abstract
This study investigates convergence in hired farm wages in U.S. counties
over the period 1978-92. The time-invariant distribution of wages is char-
acterized using Markov chains. This study is concerned with two questions:
Are regional hired farm wages moving in the same direction? If so, are they
consistent with the direction of the entire U.S. farm wages? Concerning
with e¢ ciency in agricultural labor markets, the study approximates it to
the extent that it is reected in farm wages. Time-invariant distributions of
wages are calculated for the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West region,
and for the entire U.S. The results support the hypothesis of convergence at
regional level to lower-than-respective regional average wage. Convergence
is the strongest in the Northeast and the weakest in the South. Likewise,
convergence to lower-than-average wage is present at the U.S. level, but it
is stronger than that at the regional level.
                           
JEL Codes: Q01, Q12, Q15, Q18, C21, R14
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1. Introduction
It is a law of nature that under uniform conditions, the hot weather moves toward
cold or vice versa; and as a result, after a su¢ cient period of time temperature
across locations becomes the same. The very same law makes itself known in the
context of international trade, labor market e¢ ciency, and institutional changes:
wages as the temperature in labor markets tend to equalize across economies as
trade is promoted, e¢ ciency-oriented policies are implemented, and similar labor
market institutions across economies are developed.1
Research often focuses on three main factors behind wage movements. Insti-
tutional changes, such as decline in minimum wages and unionization rate, and
increase in economic deregulation, usually occupy the rst seat in debates, while
skill-biased technological change and international trade appear in the second and
third places, respectively. For example, deunionization studied by Chaykowski and
Slotsve (1996) and Fortin and Lemieux (1997), skill-biased technological change
by Bound and Johnson (1992), Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993), Bhagwati and
Kosters (1994), and Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994), and barriers to inter-
national trade by Murphy and Welch (1991) were rather often found behind wage
inequalities. However, these studies commonly neglect factor price movements in
a specic sector within-country. With the present study investigating convergence
of the U.S. real farm wages, we add a unique observation to the literature that
low-wage counties experience faster growth of wages than do high-wage counties.
This study concentrates on the period 1978-92 because it is this period that
the U.S. agricultural sector witnessed signicant changes with respect to organi-
zational structure and labor markets. With 17 percent decline in the number of
family and partnership farms and with 45 and 36 percent increases in corporate
and co-operative farms, respectively, the U.S. agriculture experienced a signi-
cant shift from family to corporate farming (USDC, 1992). This path-breaking
organizational change would favor large farms in that they would increase their
market power and induce consumer welfare loss. With respect to labor and land
markets, labor cost increased as much as 90 percent, while land prices increased
1In the context of trade and wage relationship, see Dixit and Norman (1980), Coe (1985),
Decressin and Fatas (1993), Button and Pentecost (1993), Mallick and Carayannis (1994), Abra-
ham and Van Rompuy (1995), Abraham (1996), Carayannis and Mallick (1996); in the context
of labor market e¢ ciency and uniform wages, see Schweitzer and Dupuy (1996) and Bernard
and Jones (1996); in the context of institutional changes and factor price formation, see Ruttan
and Hayami (1978), DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996), and Card (1996).
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by only 28 percent (USDC, 1992). Finally, a signicant proportion of farms exited
or merged, with 17 percent decline in the number of farms, and acres of farmland
was reduced by 7 percent (4 percent of which is cropland). What is obvious is that
rising cost of labor concurrent with corporate farming characterizes the current
status of the U.S. farming: one which makes the emergence of new labor market
institutions and labor-saving technological change unavoidable.
Despite the theoretical expectations for convergence, whether such a process
occurs in the U.S. agricultural sector remains unclear. Agricultural producers
generally su¤er from the lack of su¢ cient local workers to harvest their crops
during the key production periods, and thus rely on large numbers of seasonal
workers. Migrant workers, comprising 42 percent of the farm labor force over
the period 1989-91, performed over half of the agricultural activities. The sea-
sonal pattern in labor demand together with the scarcity of farm workers led to
highly competitive subcontracting arrangements that push wages upward (USDL,
1994; Thilmany and Martin, 1995; Perlo¤, Lynch, and Gabbard, 1998). However,
non-overlapping harvest periods across regions help suppress wages that would
otherwise be rising. Labor demand in the South, for example, is generally at a
low in August, when the Northeast is near its peak in September, giving migrant
workers a chance to move into regions where labor is scarce. Of the migrants in
the Northeast in September, ve percent come from California, 13 percent from
within the region, 16 percent from the South, and 66 percent from outside the
U.S. (USDL, 1994).
In the period 1978-92 the share of labor cost in production expenses increased
by 25 percent, while the shares of livestock-poultry and feed for livestock re-
mained almost unchanged (USDC, 1992), manifesting signicant changes in agri-
cultural labor and other related markets to come. This study investigates the
dynamics behind this rising labor cost and hypothesizes that the cross-county
dispersion of hired farm wages in the U.S. narrowed down during 1978-92 - the
so-called convergence hypothesis. The study indirectly tests whether labor in
low-productivity counties has become more productive, while at the same time
labor in high-productivity counties remained as productive as it used to be. The
estimations are carried out at regional and at the U.S. levels, using county-level
data on hired farm wages. Consistent with theoretical expectations, convergence
in wages would suggest that low-productivity counties became more productive,
while high-productivity counties remained the same. The essence of the conver-
gence argument lies in free ow of factors from one place where productivity is low
to another where it is relatively high. If convergence is plausible at all, it surely
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is more likely to be true across regions within a country where labor markets are
subject to similar constraints and where there is no barrier to technology transfer.
This study applies a Markov chain model to allow for the integration of the
transition information in the cross-section approach with the steady state infor-
mation in the time series approach.2 This is accomplished by estimating a Markov
transition function for the data and then by inferring the time-invariant distri-
bution of the cross-section. The contributions of the study to the literature are
twofold. First, to the best of our knowledge, the study is the rst of its kind,
investigating convergence of hired farm wages in the US. Second, it brings to the
fore a nonparametric method which is very useful to project future distributions,
whose knowledge is highly desirable by policy makers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes how to
apply Markov chains to investigate convergence, and states a theorem that guaran-
tees the existence and uniqueness of time-invariant probability distribution. Data,
variables, and grouping of counties on the basis of their geographical proximity
are all described in Section 3. Discussed in Section 4 are the main ndings from
the Markov chain analysis. Finally, Section 5 elaborates on policy implications
of the ndings for the U.S. agriculture. Furthermore, Appendix outlines 2 test
statistics for the two assumptions of Markov chains.
2. Markov Chains
Consider a stochastic process fXt; t = 0; 1; 2; :::g that takes on a nite or countable
number of possible values. Unless otherwise mentioned, this set of possible values
of the process will be denoted by the set of nonnegative integers f0; 1; 2; :::g. If
Xt = i, then the process is said to be in state i at time t.
Assumption 1 (Time-stationary transition probabilities). Whenever the process
is in state i, there is a xed probability pij that it will next be in state j : that is,
pfXt+1 = j j Xt = i; Xt 1 = it 1; ::: ; X1 = i1; X0 = i0g = pij (2.1)
for all states i0; i1; ::: ; it 1; i; j and t  0: Such a stochastic process is known
as a Markov chain. Eq. (2.1) may be interpreted as stating that, for a Markov
chain, the conditional distribution of any future state Xt+1 given the past states
X0; X1; :::; Xt 1 and the present state Xt, is independent of the past states and
2Markov chains were applied by Quah (1993) to analyze convergence of cross-country growth
rates and by Robertson (1995) to investigate convergence of bank size.
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depends only on the present state. The value pij stands for the probability that
the process will, when in state i, next make a transition into state j. Since the
probabilities are nonnegative and since the process must make a transition into
some state, we have 1j=0pij = 1 for i = 0; 1; ::: and pij  0 for i; j  0:
Assumption 2 (A rst-order Markov chain). The stochastic process follows a
rst-order chain written as
Xt+1 = PXt where P = (pij): (2.2)
That is, the probability of a county being in a particular state at time (t + 1)
is solely a function of its state at time t. A second-order chain can similarly be
dened as one in which the probability of a county being in a particular state at
time (t+ 1) only depends on that countys states at times (t  1) and t.3
If Assumptions 1 and 2 are satised, then one can calculate the time-stationary
transition probabilities as pij = (
nij
ni
); which is the solution to the following max-
imization problem,
Max 
i;j
p
nij
ij subject to 
m
j=1pij = 1 for i = 0; 1; 2; :::;m and pij  0:
The term ntij is the number of counties moving from state i at time (t   1) to
state j at time t; nij = Tt=1n
t
ij is the total number of counties moving from state
i to state j over t = 1; 2; :::; T ; and ni = mj=1nij is the total number of counties
that were in state i over t = 0; 1; :::; T and i = j = 1; :::;m. The s  step  ahead
distribution should evolve as
Xt+s = [P ]
sXt: (2.3)
The time-invariant distribution  of the stochastic process is obtained as [P ]s ! 
when s!1. This distribution is one in which the elements of P no longer change
from one period to the next, although counties may continue to alter their states
over time.
Existence and uniqueness of the time-invariant distribution, . The presence
of the invariant distribution guarantees that the process is independent of initial
classication of observations. Provided below are several denitions and a the-
orem, adopted from Hoel, Port, and Stone (1987), which are used to prove the
existence and uniqueness of .
3See Appendix for testing procedures for the two assumptions.
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Denition 2.1. Class i is said to have period d if pnij = 0 whenever n is not
divisible by d, and d is the largest integer with this property. For instance, starting
in i, it may be possible for the process to enter class i only at times 2; 4; 6; 8; :::;
in which case class i has period 2.
Denition 2.2. A class with period 1 is said to be aperiodic:
Denition 2.3. Class j is said to be accessible from class i if pnij > 0 for some
n  0.
Denition 2.4. Two classes i and j that are accessible to each other are said to
communicate.
Denition 2.5. For any class i we let fi denote the probability that, starting
in class i, the process will ever reenter class i. Class i is said to be recurrent if
fi = 1; and transient if fi < 1: Class i is recurrent if
P1
n=1 p
n
ii =1 and transient
if
P1
n=1 p
n
ii <1:
Denition 2.6. A Markov chain is said to be irreducible if there is only one
grouping of classes; that is, if all classes communicate with each other.
Denition 2.7. If a class i is recurrent, then it is said to be positive recurrent
if, starting in i, the expected time until the process returns to class i is nite.
Positive recurrent, aperiodic classes are called ergodic:
Theorem 2.8. For an irreducible ergodic Markov chain, limn!1 pnij exists and
is independent of i. Furthermore, letting j = limn!1 pnij; j  0 then j is the
unique non-negative solution of
j =
1X
i=0
ipij; j  0 and
1X
j=0
j = 1: (2.4)
3. Data and variables
Data used in this study were obtained from the Census of Agriculture (USDC,
1992), with a separate cross-section of 3,130 counties for each year: 1978, 1982,
1987, and 1992. Each county is represented by an average farm in that county.
The variable of interest, which is real farm wages per worker in county c at time
6
t, is calculated as wc;t =
(Cc;t=Nc;t)
pt
: The cost of hired farm/ranch labor Cc;t in-
cludes gross salaries and wages, commissions, dismissal pay, vacation pay, and
paid bonuses paid to hired workers, family members, hired managers, adminis-
trative and clerical employees, salaried corporate o¢ cers, and supplemental cost
for benets such as employers social security contributions, unemployment com-
pensation, workmans compensation insurance, life and medical insurance, and
pension plans. The number of hired farm/ranch workers Nc;t includes paid fam-
ily members, hired bookkeepers, o¢ ce workers, and maintenance workers, if their
work is primarily associated with agricultural production. This variable also in-
cludes any short term or temporary workers who may have worked only a few
days, but does not include contract labor or custom workers. Owing to the lack
of county-level price index, we deated the nominal wages by the consumer price
index pt (1990=100, period averages): p1978 = 49:9, p1982 = 73:9, p1987 = 87, and
p1992 = 107:4 (IMF, 1998).
Denote by wrc;t the time t real farm wage prevailing in county c  region r and
calculate the regional average wage as wrt = (1=nr)
nr
c=1w
r
c;t where nr is the number
of counties in region r. Dene county cs odds ratio at time t as F rc;t = (w
r
c;t=w
r
t ).
When the analysis is carried out for the entire U.S., however, county cs odds ratio
at time t becomes Fc;t = (wc;t=wt) where wt = (1=n)nc=1wc;t with n being the
number of counties in the entire U.S.
In order to determine the number of states in the transition matrix, we apply
Cochrans (1966) variance minimization rule. First, F rc;t is calculated for the initial
period 1978, sorted in an ascending order, and nally divided into intervals (which
correspond to states in our context) in such a way that each interval has minimum
variance. For the determination of cut o¤points we simply look at the sorted data
F rc;1978; and jump points in this monotonically increasing variable are accepted as
possible cut o¤ points. The application of this procedure produced the following
5 intervals or states: for given r, State 1 = #fF rc;t 2 [0; 0:49]g; State 2 = #fF rc;t 2
[0:50; 0:99]g; State 3 = #fF rc;t 2 [1:00; 1:49]g; State 4 = #fF rc;t 2 [1:50; 1:99]g; and
State 5 = #fF rc;t > 1:99g where the sign # denotes the number of counties in the
respective set.
4. Description of transition matrices
To have a better understanding of a transition probability matrix, the conditions
under which this matrix for the Northeast region represents an irreducible, ergodic
Markov chain are discussed in detail, and the meanings of the formal denitions
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provided in Section 2 are explained with examples. A Markov chain characterizes
the long run movements in real hired farm wages and provides a description of
future changes in these wages. More specically, using Markov chains, an attempt
is made to answer three questions: Do wages tend to be equal across counties? If
so, how fast do they converge? and how does the long run distribution look like?
The transition matrix for Northeast (P )
(t+1)
States 1 2 3 4 5 N
1 0.50 0.46 0.04 20
2 0.05 0.74 0.20 0.01 214
(t) 3 0.37 0.51 0.10 0.02 115
4 0.10 0.30 0.40 0.20 29
5 0.06 0.28 0.33 0.33 12
T-invariant 0.06 0.55 0.29 0.07 0.03 390
Eigenvalues 1.00 0.66 0.46 0.26 0.10
Elements pijs in P . An element pij represents the probability that a farm
will, when in State i at time t, next make a transition into state j at time (t+ 1)
where i = j = 1; :::; 5. The elements in the rst row of P are denoted by p1j,
j = 1; :::; 5, where p11 = 0.50, p12 = 0.46, and p13 = 0.04. Of the entire sample of
390, a total of 20 farms over the period 1978-92 fell in State 1. Of these 20 farms,
50 percent (p11) remained in that same state; 46 percent (p12) moved into State
2; and four percent (p13) moved into State 3 in the following period. Similarly,
of 390 farms, a total of 214 farms fell in State 2 (i.e., the second row in P ). Of
214 farms, 74 percent (p22) remained in that same state, 20 percent (p23) moved
into State 3, one percent (p24) into State 4, ve percent (p21) into State 1 in the
following period.
State 2 is accessible from State 1 since p12 is positive (0:46). States 1 and 2 are
accessible to each other, hence they are said to communicate, and it is denoted
by 1 ! 2. In fact, all of the ve states are communicating, implying that all of
the states are in the same class. The Markov chain is then irreducible since there
is only one class. It is easy to verify that the chain P is irreducible. For example,
it is possible to go from State 1 to State 5 through the path 1 ! 2 ! 3 !
4  ! 5. That is, one way of getting from State 1 to State 5 is to go from State
1 to State 2 (with probability p12 = 0:46), then go from State 2 to State 3 (with
probability p23 = 0:20),..., nally go from State 4 to State 5 (with probability
p45 = 0:20).
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Persistence, direction of movements, and mobility. Persistence is measured
with the probabilities in the diagonal elements of P ; large values for high per-
sistence, low values for low persistence. Over this one-period horizon, the pre-
dominant feature in P is high persistence among those farms in State 2 and low
persistence in States 5 and 4, implied by the diagonal entries 0.74, 0.33, and 0.40,
respectively. This is interpreted as wages tending to move away from the regional
average corresponding to State 3. A close look at the o¤-diagonal elements also
shows a pattern of movements, one in which farms tend to move towards States
2 and 3. This is a pattern where a large majority of farms moves towards a level
little less than the regional average wage. Consider, for example, 20 farms in
State 1. Of these, 46 percent tend to move into State 2 and only four percent into
State 3 in the following period; likewise, of 29 farms in State 4, 30 percent tend
to move into State 3, while only 20 percent moving into State 5. An examination
of all the o¤-diagonal elements indicates that farms move towards States 2 and 3,
which is also justied by the time-invariant distribution with 55 percent of being
in State 2 and 29 percent of being in State 3. One can further calculate a measure
of mobility  as (P ) = (m  Trace(P ))=(m  1) = (5  2:48)=4 = 0:63 where P
is of dimension m = 5:4 The lower is , the lower mobility there is in county-level
wages (or higher persistence there is in the kernel P ) (Quah, 1993).
Time-invariant distribution, peaks, and polarization. The invariant distribu-
tion characterizes the limiting behavior of farms as the number of iterations of P
goes to 1. Nothing enforces existence or uniqueness of this distribution. That
precisely one such distribution was found is a consequence of P at hand. Note that
the invariant distribution is a projection of what is likely to happen in the future,
provided that policies remain unchanged for a su¢ ciently long period of time and
that no unforeseen events occur. The invariant distribution for the Northeast is
(1 = 0:06, 2 = 0:55, 3 = 0:29, 4 = 0:07, 5 = 0:03) (see Figure 1). Everything
else constant, this distribution states that in the nal period, States 2 and 3 should
include 84 percent (= 2 +3) of 390 farms in the Northeast. This establishes
a right skewed distribution in which there is a peak at State 2, suggesting that
at the limit the majority of farms would move away from the regional average
wage, and that wages would converge to a level lower than the regional average.
Since there is only one peak to emerge, polarization does not take place in the
Northeast. If, however, there had been two peaks, one on the lower tail and the
other on the upper tail of the invariant distribution, then one would have claimed
two peaks, implying polarization or coexistence of high and low-wage counties.
4Trace(P ) is dened as the sum of diagonal elements in P:
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Convergence and its speed. A bell-shaped distribution  should imply conver-
gence to the regional average, a left (right) skewed distribution convergence to a
level higher (lower) than the regional average, and a bi-modal distribution (or two
peaks) should imply polarization. The speed of convergence, denoted by  and
measured by the second largest eigenvalue of the kernel P , is the rate at which the
kernel converges to the time-invariant distribution. The speed for the Northeast
is 0.66:5 (This concept is di¤erent from the one used in the convergence studies
applying parametric regression method. Passing time in our context corresponds
to the speed of convergence in the parametric regression.)
2 statistics for time stationarity of P . Assumption 1 is tested by using 2
statistic under the null hypothesis that the kernel is time stationary. The null is
accepted at the 0.05 level, since the calculated-2 statistic< the table-2m(m 1)(T 1)
where m = 5 and T = 3. Had it been nonstationary, the transition probability
matrix for each period would have been examined separately.
The Midwest, South, West regions, and the entire U.S. The above interpreta-
tions also apply to transition matrices for the Midwest, South, and West regions
(see Tables 1-4). Estimation results for the Midwest are similar to those for
Northeast, implying that counties tend to cluster around States 2 and 3. That
is, low-wage (high-wage) counties tend to experience rising (declining) wage. The
time-invariant probabilities for the Midwest region indicate that, in the nal pe-
riod, States 2 and 3 are likely to include 76 percent (= 2 + 3) of total counties
with wages around the regional average. In the South, wages are expected to
be even smaller than that those in the Northeast and Midwest, with 58 percent
(= 1 + 2) of the counties in South that cluster around States 1 and 2, and this
percentage point rises to 80 percent when State 3 is added. In the West, in the
nal period, States 2 and 3 are likely to include 73 percent (= 2 + 3) of the
counties in West. To provide an economywide picture of convergence, we calcu-
lated the transition matrix for the entire U.S. The time-invariant distribution for
the whole U.S. suggests even more concentration around States 1 and 2, since in
its calculation the U.S. average farm wage was taken as the reference point. The
time-invariant distribution for the entire U.S. is (1 = 0:22; 2 = 0:46; 3 = 0:20;
4 = 0:08; 5 = 0:04) (see Figure 1).
Chi-square tests for Assumption 1 suggest that the process is time-invariant
for the Midwest, South, and West as well. Furthermore, owing to a few periods
5Since the time-invariant distribution is computed as the left eigenvector corresponding to
the (isolated) unit eigenvalue, which is the largest eigenvalue of the kernel P , the second largest
eigenvalue should measure the speed of convergence.
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of time over which the analysis is performed, we are left with the assumption,
without testing it, that the process is of rst-order. Put di¤erently, the time
horizon of the actual data is not long enough to formulate a second-order chain.
Furthermore, the mobility measure  is equal to 0:60 for the Midwest, 0:58 for the
South, 0:60 for the West, and 0:61 for the entire U.S. This indicates that counties
in the South that are represented by their average farm wages move from one state
to another at a relatively slower speed than the other regions. The South has the
highest persistence relative to the other regions and the entire U.S. Consistent
with high persistence, the South has the highest rate of convergence  = 0:79;
and for the Midwest  = 0:71, for the West  = 0:69, and for the entire U.S.
 = 0:70.
5. Key ndings and policy implications
This study is concerned with two questions: Are regional hired farm wages moving
in the same direction? If so, are they consistent with the direction of the entire U.S.
farm wages? Concerning with e¢ ciency in agricultural labor markets, the study
approximates it to the extent that it is reected in farm wages. Time-invariant
distributions of wages are calculated at region level, including the Northeast,
Midwest, South, and West regions, and at the U.S. level, and then compared
with respect to the speed of convergence and the shape of future regional wage
distributions.
The key ndings are threefold. First, in the future, wages in all the regions
are expected to decline relative to the respective, current regional average wage.
The same trend is anticipated for the entire U.S., too. This conjecture is drawn
from the shape of regional and the U.S. time-invariant distributions, all of which
are skewed right (see Figure 1).
Second, the lowest ( = 58) and highest ( = 63) mobility takes place in
the South and Northeast, respectively. In conformity with this, the South and
Northeast has the fastest ( = 0:79) and lowest ( = 0:66) speed of convergence.
The same gures for the entire U.S. are in between the gures for the South and
Northeast (i.e.,  = 61 and  = 0:70). Taken together, these indicators provide
evidence for the predicted relative stability in agricultural markets in the South.
Third, convergence to lower-than-regional average wage is the strongest in the
Northeast, reected by the highest time-invariant probability corresponding to
State 2, while it is the weakest in the South and modest at the U.S. level (see
Figure 1). This can be, in part, attributed to sharply di¤ering regional labor
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demands. In the North, where the convergence of farm wage is the highest, the
absence of a signicant supply of migrant labor creates competition for workers
from California (5 percent), the South (16 percent), outside the US (66 percent),
and within the region (13 percent) during peak labor requirements in September.
Unlike the Northeast, however, 35 percent of the migrant labor force in the South
comes from within the region, 57 percent from outside the US, 6 percent from
the Northeast, and 2 percent from California. Even at o¤-peak periods, migrants
consist of 46 percent of the Souths farm labor force. This ready supply of labor
decreases the pressure on wages, supporting the nding of weak convergence in
the South. For the US, on the other hand, the results indicate that in the long
run the average US farm wage is more likely to decline.
These ndings do hold implications for migration of labor and technological
change. With respect to migration, a signicant number of migrant labor moves
into areas of vegetables and fruits/nuts farming, while at the same time a relatively
less signicant amount goes into areas of horticulture and crop farming. For
example, the proportion of farm worker who migrated to vegetables, fruits/nuts,
horticulture, and crop farming areas was 52, 51, 29, and 20 percent, respectively,
for the period 1989-91 (USDL, 1994). But, it is fortunate that weak regional
competition for migrant labor owing to non-overlapping harvest periods keeps
wages lower than they would be otherwise. The ip side of the coin is that wages
are forced upward by within-region competition for migrant labor. Thus, because
of the signicant proportion of vegetables, fruits, and horticultural products in the
Northeast and the absence of large migrant labor force, mobility of county-level
wages would be expectably higher in that region compared to the South.
As regards technological change, there is a puzzle to solve. Considerable mi-
croevidence nds a positive relationship between the introduction of new tech-
nologies and rising wage inequality (i.e., divergence of wages) because, as Berman,
Bound, and Griliches (1994) document, industries that invest more in R&D tend
to pay a higher premium for skill. On the contrary, recent macroeconomic evi-
dence suggests that technological change and wage inequality have been negatively
correlated over time (see Blackburn, et al. (1990-91)). In the context of our study,
conjecturing a decline in future farm wages relative to the current average wage,
this puzzle raises few questions. In particular, does convergence of farm wages to
lower-than-current average suggest that the future technological change will be of
labor-saving (or labor augmenting) type? If so, what should the essential compo-
nents of new farm bill be? A better characterization of institutions that provide
technical skills is a requirement for a new farm bill, and the government should
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take the lead in the supply of such institutions not so much that the nancing of
such skill acquisition is beyond individual farmerscapacity but rather that labor-
augmenting technical skills are also more likely to lead to land saving through
intensive farming capabilities of farmers equipped with new skills. Namely, la-
bor and land saving technological changes should go hand in hand, making labor
abundant and thus cheaper.
A new farm bill may help raise productive e¢ ciency, shift production to more
productive regions, and boost aggregate output, provided that the farm legislation
frees farmers to think about the optimal mix of crops without being constrained
by government payments, and that it allows them to operate as prot maximizing
agents. The government can accelerate this process by reducing farm subsidies
and subsidies that are tied to farmers production decisions. Firstly, the new
farm bill should reduce the degree of government support to the farm sector and
phase down subsidies in the coming years. The phase-out of direct government
payments has two important implications for farm wages. Everything else equal,
a decline in farm subsidies results in a decline in farm income. To the extent
that farmers have perceived farm commodity payments as a permanent part of
farm income, this decline will be indirectly reected in farm labor demand and
wages. Moreover, the loss of farm subsidies could increase the variability in farm
income, making agricultural production more risky. Secondly, the new farm bill
should no longer use commodity programs to control output. Under previous
farm legistlations, annual set-aside programs were an important policy tool for
controlling U.S. production of major program crops. To receive federal subsidies,
farmers had to agree to set-asides of a portion of their acres. Under the new
regime, such programs should be cautiously formulated so that producers freely
respond to market prices.
This study o¤ers two challenges for further research. The rst is an exten-
sion of the current methodology to incorporate policy variables to allow for the
quantication of specic impacts. Having developed that methodology, a second
challenge is the application of the model to income from specic farming activities
so that one can compare the distribution of income across farming types. This will
help examine the trade-o¤ among alternative income sources in the agricultural
sector.
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A. Hypothesis testing
Here we present hypothesis testing procedures, adopted from Anderson and Good-
man (1957) and Goodman (1962), to investigate whether or not the transition
probability matrices at hand are time-stationary and follow a rst-order process.
For illustrative purposes, the following contingency table will be referred to through-
out this Appendix:
A(t) =
States 1 2 Total
1 nt11 n
t
12 n
t
1:
2 nt21 n
t
22 n
t
2:
Total nt:1 n
t
:2 n
t
and Zi =
t=j j = 1 j = 2
t = 1 p^1i1 p^
1
i2
t = 2 p^2i1 p^
2
i2
t = 3 p^3i1 p^
3
i2
:
If T = 3, then we will have 3 contingency tables, A(t) for t = 1; 2; 3, given two
states i = j = 1; 2. In this example, nij = 3t=1n
t
ij and ni = 
2
j=1nij = 
3
t=1n
t
i:
Assumption 1. The transition probabilities are time-stationary. Here the null
hypothesis is H0 : ptij = p^ij for all t, and an alternative to this assumption is
that the transition probability depends on t, H1 : ptij = p^
t
ij where p^
t
ij =

ntij
nt 1i

is the estimate of the transition probability for time t. Under these hypotheses,
the likelihood ratio is of the form,  = ti;j
h
p^ij
p^tij
intij
, where Tt=1i;j p^
ntij
ij hold
under H0 and Tt=1i;j(p^
t
ij)
ntij holds under H1. And  2 log  is distributed as
2(T 1)[m(m 1)] when H0 is true. It should be noted that the likelihood ratio resem-
bles likelihood ratios obtained for standard tests of homogeneity in contingency
table A(t). The null hypothesis states that the random variables represented by
the T rows in Zi have the same distribution. In order to test it, we calculate
2i = i;jn
t 1
i (p^
t
ij   p^ij)2=p^ij . If H0 is true, 2i has the limiting distribution with
(m  1)(T   1) degrees of freedom, and the set of 2i s is asymptotically indepen-
dent, and the sum, 2 = 2i=1
2
i = it;jn
t 1
i (p^
t
ij  p^ij)2=p^ij; has the usual limiting
distribution with (T   1)[m(m  1)] degrees of freedom.
Another way of testing the same hypothesis is to calculate i = t;j
h
p^ij
p^tij
intij
for i = 1; 2 by using Zi. The asymptotic distribution of  2 log i is 2i with
(m   1)(T   1) degrees of freedom. The test criterion based on  can then be
written as mi=1   2 log i =  2 log  .
Assumption 2. The Markov chain is of a given order. Intuitively speaking,
this assumption states that the location of a county at time (t+ 1) is independent
of its location at time t. A Markov chain is second-order if a county is in class
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i at time (t   2), in j at time (t   1), and in k at time t. Let ptijk denote the
probability that a county follows a second-order chain. Time stationarity then
implies ptijk = pijk for all t = 2; : : : ; T . A rst-order stationary chain is a special
case of second-order chain, one for which ptijk does not depend on i.
Now let ntijk be the number of counties in class i at (t   2), in class j at
(t   1), and in class k at t. Let nt 1ij = kntijk and nijk = Tt=2ntijk . The max-
imum likelihood estimate of pijk for stationary chains is p^ijk = (nijk=ml=1nijl) = 
Tt=2n
t
ijk=
T
t=2n
t 1
ij

. The null hypothesis in this case is H0 : p1jk = p2jk =
::: = pmjk = pjk for j; k = 1; : : : ;m. The likelihood ratio test criterion is
 = mi;j;k=1
h
p^jk
p^ijk
inijk
where p^jk = (mi=1nijk=
m
i=1
m
l=1nijl) =
 
Tt=2n
t
jk=
T 1
t=1 n
t
j

is the maximum likelihood estimate of pjk. Under the null hypothesis,  2 log 
has an asymptotic- 2m(m 1)2 distribution where 
2
j = i;kn

ij(p^ijk   p^jk)2=p^jk and
nij = knijk = k
T
t=2n
t
ijk = 
T
t=2n
t 1
ij = 
T 1
t=1 n
t
ij with (m   1)2 degrees of free-
dom. The corresponding test using the likelihood ratio is j = mi;k=1
h
p^jk
p^ijk
inijk
.
The asymptotic distribution of  2 log j is chi-square with (m   1)2 degrees of
freedom.
To test the joint hypothesis H0 : pijk = pjk for all i; j; k = 1; 2; : : : ;m, we cal-
culate 2 = mj=1
2
j = j;i;kn

ij(p^ijk  p^jk)2=p^jk which has the limiting distribution
with m(m  1)2. Similarly, the joint test criterion is mj=1   2 log j =  2 log  =
2j;i;knijk[log p^ijk   log p^jk] .
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Figure 1.  Regional versus National Distribution of Farm Wages 
Northeast
Midwest
South
0.3
0.4
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
ie
s 
(p
i)
West
USA
0.1
0.2
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
ie
s 
(p
0
1 2 3 4 5
States
19
The transition matrix for the Midwest region
States 1 2 3 4 5 N
1 0.56 0.41 0.03 243
2 0.10 0.67 0.21 0.02 1009
3 0.01 0.35 0.49 0.13 0.02 607
4 0.11 0.44 0.31 0.14 178
5 0.14 0.30 0.56 97
T-invariant 0.11 0.47 0.29 0.09 0.04 2134
Eigenvalues 1.0 0.71 0.51 0.30 0.09
The transition matrix for the South region
States 1 2 3 4 5 N
1 0.77 0.20 0.03 685
2 0.15 0.59 0.21 0.03 0.02 892
3 0.04 0.30 0.44 0.17 0.05 509
4 0.01 0.13 0.33 0.33 0.20 298
5 0.03 0.12 0.28 0.57 238
T-invariant 0.25 0.33 0.22 0.11 0.09 2622
Eigenvalues 1.0 0.79 0.55 0.29 0.08
The transition matrix for the West region
States 1 2 3 4 5 N
1 0.60 0.37 0.02 0.01 121
2 0.13 0.60 0.25 0.02 328
3 0.02 0.30 0.52 0.14 0.02 257
4 0.03 0.09 0.43 0.36 0.09 74
5 0.04 0.25 0.17 0.54 26
T-invariant 0.15 0.41 0.32 0.09 0.03 806
Eigenvalues 1.0 0.67 0.49 0.32 0.12
The transition matrix for the entire U.S.
States 1 2 3 4 5 N
1 0.66 0.30 0.03 0.01 1069
2 0.14 0.65 0.19 0.02 1443
3 0.02 0.35 0.47 0.14 0.02 1488
4 0.13 0.41 0.32 0.14 579
5 0.03 0.20 0.29 0.48 373
T-invariant 0.20 0.45 0.24 0.08 0.03 4952
Eigenvalues 1.0 0.70 0.51 0.28 0.08
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